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SOVEREIGNTY AS DISCOURSE 
THELANGUAGEOFUBERALCONSTITUTIONALffiM. 
By Howard Schweber. 1 Cambridge University Press. 2007. 
Pp. 386. Hardback. $90.00. 
Robert L. Tsai2 
Studies of language and its relationship to democratic con-
stitutionalism have yielded a number of insights, but major con-
tributions have been harder to come by. This may be partially 
explained by the multiplicity of disciplines from which a theorist 
might draw to investigate this nexus. It might also be attributed 
to the varying degrees of seriousness with which synthetic treat-
ments have been undertaken. There certainly is no shortage of 
possibilities for language to play within a theory of constitution-
alism. Words can serve purely an instrumental function in the 
resolution of issues or the broader elaboration of democratic 
"principles," "intentions," "expectations," or "values"; they may 
be constitutive of legal ideas or broader affinities; or they might 
shape, delimit, or organize the range of political and legal possi-
bilities open to certain institutions or society as a whole. 
On to this landscape appears Howard Schweber's learned 
and ambitious book, The Language of Liberal Constitutionalism. 
Professor Schweber, who teaches political theory and law at the 
University of Wisconsin, takes seriously the proposition that the 
relationship between language and constitutionalism must be 
both carefully investigated and normatively justified. Arguing 
from within liberal theory, he boldly argues that "the creation of 
a legitimate constitutional regime depends on a prior commit-
ment to employ constitutional language, and that such a com-
mitment is both the necessary and the sufficient condition for 
constitution making" (p. 7). 
1. Associate Professor of Political Science. University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
2. Professor of Law. American University. Washington College of Law. Thanks to 
Howard Schweber. whose clarifications deepened my appreciation for his work and im-
proved my critique of it. 
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If Schweber's work is measured against this criteria-the 
disciplines upon which he draws, the seriousness with which he 
undertakes the project of synthesis, and the role that language 
plays in the process of constitutional lawmaking-it is possible to 
evaluate the strengths of his treatment as well as the basic pro-
ject of theorizing a place for language in democratic constitu-
tionalism. 
I 
Lately, law-as-language scholarship has fallen into one of 
two broad genres. First, one might turn to linguistics, rhetoric, or 
psychology to shed light on particular social ills or the dynamics 
of judicial reasoning. We might call this an instance of applied 
language studies. Such works are too numerous to count, but the 
best of such work include treatments by Lawrence Solan and 
Steven Winter.' Second, drawing upon the rhetorical tradition, 
one might theorize more broadly the ways in which language 
provides a means for collective self-governance. In this oeuvre, 
we encounter the work of contemporary authors such as Paul 
Kahn, Martha Nussbaum, Jefferson Powell, and James Boyd 
White.4 
The Language of Liberal Constitutionalism falls squarely 
within the second genre. It is a work of high theory, crafted with 
an eye toward provoking a reconsideration of the nature of con-
stitutionalism, liberalism, and judicial review. If Schweber elabo-
rates a central thesis, it is that "sovereignty is not authority over 
language; it is rather authority exercised as a language" (p. 133). 
In making this initial characterization of the relationship be-
tween language and politics, Schweber powerfully restates the 
terms of the debate. The strongest claim about law is that it is 
not merely a tool for articulating a preexisting political will, but 
rather that the two are, in some elemental manner, indistin-
3. See LAWRENCE SOLAN. THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993): STEVEN L. 
WINTER. A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW. LIFE. AND MIND (2001): Clark Cunning-
ham eta/ .. Plain Meaning and Hard Cases. 103 YALE L.J. 1561 (1994): Steven L. Winter. 
The Meaning of"" Under Color of Law, .. 91 MICH. L. REV. 323 ( 1992). 
4. See JOHN BRIGHAM, CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE: AN INTERPRETATION OF 
Jl'DICIAL DECISION (1978): PAUL KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY F. MADISON 
A:-.;D THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (2002): MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM. POETIC 
JI.JSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE (1997): H. JEFFERSON 
POWELL. A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND 
POLITICS (2002): JAMES BOYD WHITE. LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE EMPIRE OF 
FORCE (2006): JAMES BOYD WHITE. HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND 
POETICS OF LAW ( 1989). 
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guishable. Far from occupying a subordinate status, the true role 
of language is to constitute the political will, giving it recogniz-
able form and rendering it a matter of everyday practice. Sover-
eignty exists only to the extent it can be given linguistic meaning. 
Here Schweber is at his best, revisiting the writings of 
Locke, Bodin, and Hobbes in order to show how liberal theorists 
subordinated language to the popular will without sufficiently 
interrogating the interrelationship of the two. He convincingly 
establishes how a pre-existing language must exist for an initial 
act of political creation to have meaning, as well as for subse-
quent exercises of political will to be comprehensible. The writ-
ing is crisp, insightful, and exhilarating as the book weaves in 
and out of major works in the liberal canon. Few who work in 
this vein have bothered to engage such texts (White is one of the 
few who come to mind)-and Schweber goes deeper than most. 
A relationship between self-government and language has been 
presumed more than it has actually been theorized, which makes 
a return to canonical texts in the field of politics with this ques-
tion in mind so timely. It is a question that is made all the more 
pressing in light of the broader turn toward the humanities and 
social sciences to illuminate the Constitution, which has all too 
often ignored normative questions in the quest for a sound de-
scriptive theory. In the search for a coherent account of constitu-
tional language, Schweber reminds us that what the proper role 
language should play must be answered by reference to a com-
munity's authoritative traditions.' 
Schweber separates himself from others working in this vein 
by claiming that a common language is sufficient to comprise a 
people's constitutional project and by generalizing the nature of 
liberalism across populations, experiences, and cultures. What 
are we to make of Schweber's rather strong claim that a people's 
consent to use a common language comprises not only the be-
ginning but also the core of the liberal project? Many would ad-
mit that the existence of a shared language is a necessary pre-
condition for constitutionalism, but is it sufficient? The claim 
that a common, artificial mode of discourse is enough to legiti-
mate a legal regime should strike readers as novel as it is pro-
5. Schweber and I are in accord on this point. In my own writings. I have sug-
gested that historical practice and the importance that institutions play in American con-
stitutionalism provide independent reasons for taking the normative question seriously. 
See ROBERT L. TSAI. ELOQUENCE AND REASON: CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT 
CULTURE ch. 2 (2008): Robert L. Tsai. Democracy's Handmaid. R6 B.U.L. REV. 1. 6--Il 
(2006). 
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vocative. Insofar as it is possible for a people to agree to any-
thing at all over a period of time, a particular way of talking poli-
tics might be the most we can expect. 
Whether imagined as revealed in the moment of constitu-
tion writing as a commitment to a particular language (Schwe-
ber's approach) or in how Americans have actually employed 
that language over time,6 the consent approach seems strongest 
here precisely because it is possible to imagine agreement as to 
rhetorical form while recognizing profound disagreement over 
substantive principles, end-goals, and worldviews. An individual 
might decide to take his chances and participate in such a politi-
cal order. With life circumstances hypothetically veiled or even 
with full knowledge of actual privileges and disabilities, broad 
consent is possible because the system formally ensures no per-
manent winners and losers, and secures everyone's capacity to 
dissent. A shared language is sufficient to bind the citizenry and 
thereby create political order because a constitution can still be 
said to be functioning even if dominant readings of text change 
over time, institutional alignments are in flux, or if officials en-
dorse opposing values at different historical moments. 
Notice that if a common language is enough to legitimate 
the product of public debate as constitutional, then we find our-
selves in a world in which a constitution is no longer primarily 
about ensuring the durability of particular ideas (written or un-
written)-only some continuing minimal commitment to such a 
project is enough. It is a world in which fierce contest over con-
ceptions of the good life persists, as well as over the procedures 
for debating and implementing such valuations. In a society gov-
erned by agreement to utilize a particular language, even a great 
deal of governing language remains up for grabs. 
Is there some point at which talking intelligibly is not 
enough? What if authoritative speakers continued to mouth fa-
miliar words, but the meanings of such words became so dis-
torted in concrete cases that average citizens see a perversion of 
prevailing or committed values-would we still have a constitu-
tion? I suspect Schweber's answer would be "no," though how 
we would recognize that line had been crossed is unanswered. 
This brings us to the author's goal of establishing the exis-
tence of liberal language. Has there ever been something we can 
describe as a single "liberal constitutional language"? If so, does 
6. This would characterize the approach of those who have focused on actual us-
age of constitutional language, including my own work to this point. 
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it exist now? The claim. which moves beyond the question of 
consent, actually combines a historical claim with an empirical 
one, but the book doesn't make significant headway on either, 
mostly because of its methodological constraints. To make such 
a claim of universality with greater force, Schweber might con-
sider comparative treatments to show whether and, if so, to what 
extent the foundational discourse of England or France or Can-
ada really can be said to resemble the language of American 
constitutionalism. It may be that differences among citizens' en-
counters in liberal democracies amount to differences in dialect 
or usage. But it may instead be that, upon further investigation, 
these differences are so great it makes better sense to treat each 
polity as having its own democratic language. 
The suggestion that a universal liberal language unites de-
mocratic citizens across geographic boundaries and national af-
finities is a tempting one, giving rise to many intriguing collateral 
ramifications if true. Claims of a common linguistic or cultural 
heritage have been a staple of public debate and political theory. 
Yet an anthropological skepticism may be warranted to leaven 
Schweber's account, which proceeds thus far exclusively from 
within liberalism itself. Taking theorists' assertions at face value 
risks replicating liberalism's ideological ambitions rather than 
uncovering its many instantiations. 
II 
Having made his case that liberal constitutional language is 
a distinctive phenomenon, Schweber proceeds to unpack the im-
plications of this revelation. Because his aim is to delineate the 
basic features of something approaching a universal liberal lan-
guage, this initial commitment pushes him toward broad and thin 
characteristics that might be amenable to consent from a diverse 
citizenry. Such a strategy might also aid the account in surviving 
an empirical challenge. Incisively discussing the work of con-
temporary liberal theorists, he argues that there are three neces-
sary traits of a common constitutional language: exclusivity, in-
completeness, and substance. By exclusivity, Schweber means 
that appropriate constitutional grammar has an "exclusionary 
effect on some set of propositions" (p. 203). By "incomplete-
ness," he means that "some degree of 'incompleteness' at the 
semantic level" and "some degree of openness to different sub-
stantive conclusions" must be tolerated (pp. 227-28). By "sub-
stance," he refers to the rules and outcomes that might be 
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adopted, and over which passionate dispute should be antici-
pated. Relying on Dworkin's writings on the orientation that a 
legal actor should adopt toward the task of interpretation,7 
Schweber contends that respect for officials who act with "integ-
rity" in employing constitutional language satisfies this condition 
(pp. 290-91, 318). 
There is a way to read Schweber's derivation of these traits 
as arising from basic intuitions about the social world. Although 
legal language presents itself as distinctive and autonomous, in 
fact it cannot hope to capture the universe of discourses and 
human experiences (p. 220). Similarly, it is impossible to have 
rhetorical form without some content. Content and form come 
together in some magical fashion with any effective mode of de-
liberation. But Schweber's elaboration of the notions of exclusiv-
ity and incompleteness seem to be based on something more: the 
sketch of a linguistic apparatus to which most citizens might 
agree-what he refers to as "the level of semantic commitment" 
(p. 227). Seen in this light, Schweber is searching for structural 
conditions that might garner the most social support-explicit or 
otherwise- from the broadest range of citizens, and "in the face 
of a plurality of value commitments" (p. 324). 
Having committed himself to three semantic principles, the 
author goes on to say something about how a working system of 
foundational discourse should appear. To Schweber, the mean-
ing of a term "may-indeed, is most likely required to-grow 
away from the meanings attached to those terms in ordinary, le-
gal, or religious discourse" (p. 307). Thus, a mature system of 
constitutional language becomes increasingly autonomous, spe-
cialized, and secular. Yet each of these claims would fare better 
with further refinement. 
Legal language appears to be increasingly autonomous, spe-
cialized, and secular if one shifts perspective from a general de-
scription of constitutional language in society to inhabiting the 
mindset of a particular institutional actor (i.e., the jurist), and 
only if certain contingencies of historical development hold true 
7. RONALD DWORKIN. FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996): RONALD DWORKIN. LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). Dworkin 
argues that legal actors must behave according to a norm of "integrity." such that the law 
is treated in a manner that gives it internal coherence. DWORKIN, LA w·s EMPIRE, supra. 
at 184. In Schweber's formulation, "a strong norm of integrity creates a constructive dis-
course among the members of a political association," leading to "the proposition that a 
constitutional language is required, at a minimum. to contain a degree of normative sub-
stantive sufficient to generate an integral normative system" (pp. 288-91). 
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in the long run. Actual practice has proven more complicated. 
Nowhere is the reformulated integrity thesis more provocative, 
and possibly erroneous, than in the author's assertion that con-
stitutional language must be preserved against religious dis-
course.8 I read Schweber to mean that a constitutional actor 
should not point to sacred texts or traditions to flesh out the 
meaning of text, give religious reasons for taking a legal position, 
or draw upon sacred imagery to persuade. Importantly, he does 
not argue that claims based on morality or religion are excluded 
totally, but that they must "undergo translation into constitu-
tional language before they can become elements of a legitimate 
constitutional discussion" (p. 14). 
Adherence to a modified Lockean notion of consent con-
tinues to drive this aspect of his thesis, namely, that citizens 
would agree to engage only in secular modes of discourse. An 
atheist might object to a wide-open regime of debate for fear 
that religious discourse will inevitably embody a preference for a 
particular worldview, but ideological spillover is a risk entailed 
in any form of argumentation. Moreover, why would anyone else 
renounce religious arguments? Given that faith comprises a facet 
of many citizens' understanding of the good life, agreeing to re-
linquish such an effective and responsive mode of debate seems 
doubtful in the original position or at the moment of constitution 
writing.9 Perhaps the atheist would find instrumental reasons for 
keeping religious modalities in circulation, even where ascriptive 
rationales are wanting. 
In fact, Americans' experience in liberal self-governance is 
awash in sacred imagery. The Declaration of Independence be-
gins with a direct appeal to "the Laws of Nature and Nature's 
God," in particular, the rights of men "endowed by their Crea-
tor." It may be true that the draftsmen of the Constitution toned 
down religious references, but one searches in vain for an ex-
plicit bar on any forms of constitutional argumentation. Even 
8. Elsewhere. the author contends that resort to the common law in constitutional 
adjudication ""threatens the integrity of constitutional language" (p. 332). This point is 
not developed at length. but is provocative enough that it deserves greater airing. For it 
presumes that common law methods are different enough from legitimate sovereignty-
based discourses to put the latter at risk. and also that they cannot be counted as simply a 
set of conflict-resolving protocols that are compatible within a rich linguistic tradition. 
9. In America. for instance. belief in God or some higher power remains a power-
ful force in many citizens' lives. even though organized religion has given way to more 
individualistic, pluralistic. and informal modes of religious identification and self-
organization. See Gallup: Religion. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1690/Religion.aspx>. A 
person in the original position might not agree to give up a persuasive method of relating 
to others for fear of turning out as an atheist when the veil of ignorance is stripped away. 
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when we turn to judges in particular, the ratification debates 
confirm, rather than undermine, that a significant range of rhe-
torical discretion was intended (Schweber is on firmer ground in 
arguing that whatever constitutional arsumentation is, it's cer-
tainly not talking about ordinary law). 1 The absence of meth-
odological restrictions in construing the Constitution may ex-
plain the author's effort to describe a ban on religious 
justifications as a background norm required by the liberal tradi-
tion. It is possible to argue that that religious arguments are 
uniquely distorting during the process of give-and-take, but that 
position would have to be defended. None of this is to say that 
such a rule of exclusion cannot be justified, but only that it does 
not flow inexorably from Schweber's earlier premises or Ameri-
cans' own exercise in constitution writing. 11 
Natural law rhetoric infused governing ideas at the Found-
ing and for many generations thereafter, and a significant mixing 
of the secular and sacred remains in modern debate. It is true 
that direct invocations of religious text are now generally disfa-
vored in judicially sanctioned readings of the law, and especially 
in the collaborative opinions produced by the United States 
Supreme Court, but this is a relatively recent development. And 
even if modern judges prefer the general terminology of "moral-
ity" over openly religious idioms, it seems unlikely that ordinary 
citizens, whose allegiances to the state arise from both rational 
and ascriptive dynamics, would have similar qualms. 
Moments of revolutionary change (creation or renewal) are 
often accompanied by a burst of popular appropriation from re-
ligious traditions regarding higher obligations, democratic faith, 
social justice, and other affinity-based ties that bind. Schweber's 
rule of exclusion would take such arguments off the table for the 
slaveholder and the abolitionist alike, the defender of traditional 
marriage as well as the activist who believes that Christian char-
ity favors inclusive treatment of the despised. Even if it is true 
that sacred ideas must interact with secular ones for them to be 
taken seriously as constitutional arguments, their power depends 
not in the sanitization of their religiosity, but in the fact that pa-
rochial elements remain recognizable. Hybridity, then, is 
10. See TSAI, supra note 5, at ch. 6. 
11. Should such a rule of exclusion be treated as an instance of equal treatment be-
cause the religiously-motivated speaker is not prevented from participating in public de-
bate so long as he speaks in neutral terms? Or is this a violation of the notion of equal 
liberty? For a discussion of the challenges of religion in a democracy. see AMY 
GUTMANN. IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 151-91 (2003). 
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achieved through a synthesis of constitutional language with or-
dinary language rather than a one-for-one substitution of, say, 
secular modalities for religious ones. Depending on how it is en-
forced, Schweber's exclusivity thesis risks making liberal consti-
tutionalism more elite or pristine than actual linguistic practice 
suggests. Because ideal theory is the name of the game, some di-
vergence between practice and aspiration is perfectly acceptable. 
But the point at which a disjunction matters is when the defini-
tion of a people's shared language stops promoting participation 
and starts fueling alienation. 
It is now possible to see that Schweber's ambition to trace 
the structure of liberal constitutionalism, which encompasses 
many different nations, each with its own indigenous culture and 
democratic iterations, exerts hydraulic pressure on his claim that 
liberalism demands secularization. Schweber's detailed treat-
ment of Locke's ideas. especially the decision to "sever[] the le-
gitimating basis for government from any necessary theological 
source" (p. 61 ), gestures toward a justification from within liber-
alism. But if so, the American experience, with its citizens' fre-
quent resort to religious grammar and ideas to invigorate consti-
tutional text, would have to be seen as a special case, an 
anomaly. Whatever the truth, the point remains: the seculariza-
tion of constitutional language is not obviously compelled by the 
tradition itself. Nor is it apparent that the strong trend against 
invocations of the sacred is here to stay (it goes without saying 
that a number of established and fledgling democracies overtly 
mix the two, though it may be possible to deny some of these so-
cieties the label of liberal democracy). 1c 
Once sovereignty is conceptualized as the exercise of a self-
contained language, rhetorical choice must be not only author-
ized but also disciplined. The question that arises next: just how 
disciplined must that political language be? To Schweber, "seri-
ous errors of modern constitutional practice appear in the failure 
to preserve the boundaries of constitutional language against a 
variety of competing forms of discourse, including the languages 
of religious morality and ordinary law" (p. 8). Schweber is 
chiefly concerned with the "degradation" of constitutional Ian-
12. For a discussion of some of these polities, see NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: 
AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY (2004) (proposing a state 
that endorses Islam as official religion but is otherwise compatible with liberal constitu-
tionalism); Nelson Tebbe. Witchcraft and Statecraft: Liberal Democracy in South Africa, 
96 GEO. L.J. 183 (2007) (discussing how South Africa can accommodate witchcraft while 
adhering to central tenets of liberalism). 
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guage as a self-contained system. But is it the appearance of be-
ing compromised or the fact of impurity that worries Schweber 
the most? This remains uncertain. What begins as a general in-
quiry into the structure of foundational discourse eventually 
turns into a more focused investigation into how judges should 
understand their own roles within this system. 
III 
Because Schweber shifts from elaborating the elementary 
features of constitutional language to prescribing a particular in-
stitutional role, fresh considerations necessarily arise. It is not 
clear whether judicial decisions are merely one instance of a 
general phenomenon or instead are unique, perhaps even privi-
leged speakers, bound by institutionally-specific roles. There 
may be reasons why we might prefer judges to speak in a par-
ticular way but would tolerate greater latitude among ordinary 
citizens or elected officials. Or perhaps Schweber's point is that 
despite differences in office, the structure of foundational dis-
course remains largely the same. 
To the extent that juridic language is what he focuses upon, 
leaving aside the nature of non-judicial discourse, Schweber 
heartily endorses the translation model of adjudication. 11 He in-
sists upon "the necessity of translation, the obligation to convert 
propositions of moral or policy preference or ordinary law into 
constitutional language" (p. 318). But which is it? Is a decision-
maker "translating" moral values first articulated by others into 
another language? Is he "converting" policy preferences into 
more intelligible or more inaccessible terminology? In fairness, 
Schweber is not alone in relying upon this analogy. Many re-
spectable theorists, not to mention actual judges and lawyers, 
find themselves attracted to the translation trope because the 
cultural associations of the metaphor are quite strong. The "in-
terpretation" model acknowledges, implicitly, that judges are do-
ing something when they read text; and yet it couches the act in 
terms that evoke notions of fidelity and accuracy. 
There are times that Schweber appears to be not only de-
scribing how the system works, but also staking out a position 
with more normative bite. This is one of them. To Schweber, 
"the importation of legal and moral norms into constitutional 
discourse represents examples of the failure of judicial actors to 
13. TSAI. supra note 5. at ch. 6. 
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maintain the exclusivity and incompleteness of constitutional 
language" (p. 333). The author presumes, but does not elabo-
rate, why judges are especially competent to patrol the bounda-
ries and content of governing language. 14 He states simply: "Con-
stitutional officials' authority derives from their special expertise 
in helping us fulfill our commitment to the creation and mainte-
nance of constitutional language better than we would be able to 
do on our own" (pp. 316-17). 
This is an intriguing point. Even so, whether and to what ex-
tent jurists' rhetorical preferences should be granted a monopoly 
over competing formulations is a separate question that assent to 
a shared language alone cannot resolve. I might choose to abide 
by a common language for reasons of intelligibility and fellow-
ship, but I cannot imagine giving up my rhetorical autonomy 
over foundational language to some institution or others. At this 
point, it is possible to imagine a kind of partial consent over gov-
erning discourse: granted to certain institutions for the purpose 
of dispute resolution because legal controversies must be de-
cided, with sovereignty over language and values retained by the 
people themselves. Instead, Schweber prefers more complete 
alienation of control over language: "citizens remain autono-
mous legal subjects, but at the cost of losing the freedom to 
choose the language they employ in articulating legitimating 
claims" (p. 316). Subsequent transformations may alter the sub-
stance of legal language, but they cannot generate consent in the 
sense that Schweber has defined it. 
All of this suggests that once the question of institutional 
authority over language is taken up in earnest, we must confront 
substantive commitments more directly. Schweber's criticism of 
value-laden theories fuses his minimal account of legal language 
(the book's initial set of claims) with his minimalist account of 
judicial review (sketched later in the book). Thus, as a work of 
constitutional (as opposed to merely language) theory, it posi-
tions itself as thinner than Dworkin, less departmentalist in ori-
entation than Whittington,1' and less unruly than, say, Acker-
man16 or Kramer. 17 Its focus on the "minimal content" of 
14. For a critique of the grammarian·s approach. see J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levin-
son. Constitutional Grammar. 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771 (1994). 
15. KEITH WHITIINGTON. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING ( 1999). 
16. BRUCE ACKERMAN. WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993): BRUCE 
ACKERMAN. WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS ( 1992). 
17. LARRY KRAMER. THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004): Larry Kramer. Popular Constitutionalism. circa 2004. 92 
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constitutional language makes it a close cousin of Sunstein's 
Burkean minimalism through its reliance on its idea of an in-
completely theorized agreement/8 without minimalism's com-
mitment to procedure or tradition. 
Even so, this positioning with respect to the judicial func-
tion is surprising in more ways than one. Having started with the 
premise that legal discourse is a species of political discourse, 
Schweber eventually takes the position that those connections 
must be severed, or at least minimized. And it is up to judges to 
spearhead this program. Rather than a rich governing language 
arising from and sustaining its contacts with its multiple sources, 
he envisions a specialized language "that does not keep 'one foot 
in the lifeworld,"' and does not "assert the constructive authority 
that positive law exercises" (p. 313). Perhaps the juridic language 
of resolution should tend toward broad and generic statements 
for reasons of inclusion, but if it does so, it risks obscuring the 
questions of power that lie behind such judicial presentations 
and misleading citizens into believing that law is as orderly as 
resolutions are made to appear. 
It is not readily apparent, moreover, why a minimal judicial 
role necessarily follows from a language-based account of consti-
tutionalism. Such an account makes sense only if Schweber ad-
heres to some notion of courts as countermajoritarian institu-
tions-but the degree of his endorsement of this conventional 
wisdom is not fully analyzed. At all events, such a position must 
be grounded in a more robust account of how courts relate to 
other institutions and what they owe average citizens, rather 
than derived from an original decision to resort to a common 
governing language. 
A more robust depiction of the judicial function may be 
more apt. Schweber is surely correct that a general commitment 
to ensuring a modicum of coherence to the law falls within the 
judge's job description. Yet judges are not merely defenders of 
linguistic nationalism. Rather, they are artists of sorts, appropri-
ating from ordinary language and popular modes of talking 
along with canonical texts to construe the Constitution.19 They 
CAL. L. REV. 959 (2004). 
18. For an evolution of Sunstein's approach, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT 
A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 3-14 (1999); CASS SUNSTEIN, 
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minima/ism, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 353 (2006). 
19. See generally TSAI, supra note 5, at chs. 4-5. Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, 
Constitutional Borrowing (working paper on file with author) (turning borrowing from a 
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are also mediators, endorsing certain public discourses and re-
sisting others, but never fully authorized to or fully capable of 
exerting total control over the development of governing lan-
guage. This more vibrant rendering of judicial review can only 
be detected by seeing what jurists actually do in the name of lib-
eralism, not by taking the liberal's aspirations for the truth of the 
matter asserted. 
The Language of Liberal Constitutionalism is a valuable 
contribution to the extant literature and a pleasure to read. It 
deserves to be engaged, and its many provocative points consid-
ered. Working through the book's productive interactions with a 
broad and deep set of texts alone is worth the time. In pursuing a 
line of inquiry that reframes sovereignty as participation in and 
management of a civic language, the author asks and begins to 
answer questions of the first order. 
ma~ter of constitutio~ writing to one of everyday practice, defending it as normatively 
deSirable, and suggestmg criteria by which to critique instances of borrowing). 
